Voting, Success, and Superstars

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Principles of Complex Systems, Vols. 1, 2, & 3D
CSYS/MATH 6701, 6713, & a pretend number, 2023–2024| @pocsvox

Prof. Peter Sheridan Dodds | @peterdodds

Computational Story Lab | Vermont Complex Systems Center
Santa Fe Institute | University of Vermont






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Outline

Winning: it's not for everyone

- Superstars
- Musiclab

References


THE SUN
THE GOLDEN AGE OF REDUCTIONISM
THE MANIFESTO
THE WEIL OF SCALES
THE LAWS OF DECAYING POWER
THE UNEXPECTED TRANSFIGURATION
MINISTRY OF RANDOM WALKS
THE RICH GET RICHER
THE DREAM OF EFFICIENT LANGUAGE
THE LAW OF DIGITS FIRST
THE SURPRISE OF BEING BORROWED
THE MISREADING OF THE BOOK OF SAND
THE MANY TALES OF MANY TAILS
THE MEASURING
THE DATA POOR
THE POOLING DATA
THE CHARMS OF THE MANY WRING PAIRS
THE BOOKS THAT SHOULD NOT BE OPENED
THE KNOWLEDGE OF DEAD MANKS
THE EMERGENCE OF STRUCTURE
THE EMERGENCE OF DESTRUCTION
THE EMERGENCE OF THINKING
It was the best of times,
THE EMERGENCE OF STORIES
THE MECHANICS STATISTICAL
THE THRESHOLDS OF PERCOLATION
THE NETWORKS COMPLEX
THE ELEMENTS OF WEBS
THE BIRDS OF A FEATHER
THE BIRDS OF NOT A FEATHER
THE ARK OF THE RANDOM NETWORK
THE STRANGENESS OF FRIENDS
THE SMALLNESS OF WORLDS
THE THEORY OF SIX DEGREES
THE NETWORKS FREE OF SCALE
CLASSIFIED PHOENIX BIO HAZARD
THE CONTAGION
THE CONFUSION OF CONTAGIONS
THE DISEASE OF RANDOM MIXING
THE UNENDING PANDEMICS
THE THRESHOLDS OF THE MIND
THE SOCIAL WILD
THE SOCIAL CONTAGION
THE RATIO OF GAIN
THE TALK OF FAME
THE STORIES CONTAGIOUS
THE JOHN DORY
THE ADJACENT NARRATIVES
THE STORYTELLERS
THE FATED CENTRAL PATH
THE PATHS OF UNIVERSALITY
THE DEPENDENT PATHS
THE TROUBLES OF BIFURCATING REALITIES
THE UNKNOWN MECHANISM
THE LANDSCAPE OF FORKING PATHS
THE NETWORKS OF BLOOD
THE TREES OF REALITY
THE ORDERS OF STREAMS
THE LAWS OF BRANCHING
THE SCALING OF BROKEN HIERARCHIES
THE BRAID OR THE BRANCH
THE LAW OF OPTIMAL FORKS
THE CHURCH OF QUARTEROLOGY
THE TRUTHICIDE
THE FAMILY OF PANCAKE COWS
THE FAMILY OF SPHERICAL COWS
THE IMPROBABLE PACHYDERM
THE ILL-SCALING OF ALLOMETRIC BODIES
THE SUPPLY MOST FAIR
THE SUPPLY TO THE MOST
THE DARK ART OF GENERATING FUNCTIONS
THE RANDOM SUM OF RANDOMNESS
THE TWO-SIDED WORLDS
THE STORIES AND THE TROPES
THE TRUTH OF DIFFUSION
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THE CHAOS OF FETTERED CONTAGION
THE END


THE MECHANICS OF FAME

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Winning: it's not for everyone

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

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
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Examples:

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
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
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

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

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
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- Highly skewed distributions again...

Superstars

Rosen's theory:

- Individual quality q maps to reward $R(q)$.



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

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

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

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

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

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

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- Joint consumption versus public good.
- No social element—success follows 'inherent quality'.



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

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

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

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

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

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- Argues desire for coordination in knowledge and culture leads to differential success



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

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

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

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- Argues desire for coordination in knowledge and culture leads to differential success
- Success can be purely a social construction
- (How can we measure 'inherent quality'?)



Voting

Evidence from the web suggestions (Huberman et al.)

1. Easy decisions (yes/no) lead to bandwagoning
   - e.g. jyte.com
2. More costly evaluations lead to oppositional votes
   - e.g. amazon.com

- Self-selection: Costly voting may lower incentives for those who agree with the current assessment and increase incentives for those who disagree.

Voting

Score-based voting versus rank-based voting:


A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking

"A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking"

Balinski and Laraki, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., **104**, 8720–8725, 2007. [2]



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
PHYSICA A

Aggregating partial, local evaluations to achieve global ranking

Paolo Laureti, Lionel Moret*, Yi-Cheng Zhang

"Aggregating partial, local evaluations to achieve global ranking"
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- Model: participants rank n objects based on underlying quality q

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

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

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

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

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- If $\alpha > 1$, some objects are never evaluated and mistakes are made...

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

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- Model: participants rank n objects based on underlying quality q
- Assume evaluation of object i is a random variable with mean q_i
- Choose objects based on votes:

$$p_i(t) \propto v_i(t)^\alpha \text{ or } p_i(t) \propto q_i v_i(t)^\alpha.$$

- If $\alpha < 1$, correct quality ordering is uncovered
- If $\alpha > 1$, some objects are never evaluated and mistakes are made...
- Related to Adler's approach

Dominance hierarchies


Individual differences versus social dynamics in the formation of animal dominance hierarchies

"Individual differences versus social dynamics in the formation of animal dominance hierarchies"

Chase et al.,
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., **99**, 5744-5749, 2002. [3]

- The aggressive female Metriaclima zebra:



Dominance hierarchies

Fish forget—changing of dominance hierarchies:





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



- 22 observations: about 3/4 of the time, hierarchy changed

Dominance hierarchies



- Group versus isolated interactions produce different hierarchies

Outline

Winning: it's not for everyone

- Superstars
- Musiclab

References



Music Lab Experiment

48 songs
30,000 participants



multiple 'worlds'
Inter-world variability

Music Lab Experiment



48 songs
30,000 participants

multiple 'worlds'
Inter-world variability

- How probable is the world?

Music Lab Experiment



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Inter-world variability

- How probable is the world?
- Can we estimate variability?

Music Lab Experiment



48 songs
30,000 participants

multiple 'worlds'
Inter-world variability

- How probable is the world?
- Can we estimate variability?
- Superstars dominate but are unpredictable. Why?

Music Lab Experiment

Music Lab – Song Selection - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Help

http://www.musiclab.columbia.edu/me/songs

[Help] [Log off]

	# of down loads		# of down loads		# of down loads
HARTSFIELD: "enough is enough"	20	GO MOREDCAI: "it does what its told"	12	UNDO: "while the world passes"	24
DEEP ENOUGH TO DIE: "for the sky"	17	PARKER THEORY: "she said"	47	UP FOR NOTHING: "in sight of"	13
THE THRIFT SYNDICATE: "2003 a tragedy"	20	MISS OCTOBER: "pink agression"	27	SILVERFOX: "gnaw"	17
THE BROKEN PROMISE: "the end in friend"	19	POST BREAK TRAGEDY: "florence"	14	STRANGER: "one drop"	10
THIS NEW DAWN: "the belief above the answer"	12	FORTHFADING: "fear"	24	FAR FROM KNOWN: "route 9"	18
NOONER AT NINE: "walk away"	6	THE CALEFACTION: "trapped in an orange peel"	20	STUNT MONKEY: "inside out"	46
MORAL HAZARD: "waste of my life"	8	52METRO: "lockdown"	17	DANTE: "lifes mystery"	14
NOT FOR SCHOLARS: "as seasons change"	27	SIMPLY WAITING: "went with the count"	16	FADING THROUGH: "wish me luck"	10
SECRETARY: "keep your eyes on the ballistics"	5	STAR CLIMBER: "tell me"	38	UNKNOWN CITIZENS: "falling over"	34
ART OF KANLY: "seductive intro, melodic breakdown"	10	THE FASTLANE: "til death do us part (i dont)"	31	BY NOVEMBER: "if i could take you"	20
HYDRAULIC SANDWICH: "separation anxiety"	20	A BLINDING SILENCE: "miseries and miracles"	17	DRAWN IN THE SKY: "tap the ride"	12
EMBER SKY: "this upcoming winter"	25	SUM RANA: "the bolshevik boogie"	15	SELSIUS: "stars of the city"	22
SALUTE THE DAWN: "i am error"	13	CAPE RENEWAL: "baseball warlock v1"	12	SIBRIAN: "eye patch"	14
RYAN ESSMAKER: "detour_(be still)"	14	UP FALLS DOWN: "a brighter burning star"	11	EVAN GOLD: "robert downey jr"	10
BEERBONG: "father to son"	12	SUMMERSWASTED: "a plan behind destruction"	17	BENEFIT OF A DOUBT: "run away"	38
HALL OF FAME: "best mistakes"	19	SILENT FILM: "all i have to say"	61	SHIPWRECK UNION: "out of the woods"	16



Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market

"An experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market"

Salganik, Dodds, and Watts, Science, **311**, 854–856, 2006. [6]



Music Lab Experiment

Experiment 1



Experiments 2–4



Music Lab Experiment





- Variability in final rank.

Music Lab Experiment



- Variability in final number of downloads.

Music Lab Experiment



- Inequality as measured by Gini coefficient:

$$G = \frac{1}{(2N_s - 1)} \sum_{i=1}^{N_s} \sum_{j=1}^{N_s} |m_i - m_j|$$

Music Lab Experiment



Unpredictability

$$U = \frac{1}{N_s \binom{N_w}{2}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_s} \sum_{j=1}^{N_w} \sum_{k=j+1}^{N_w} |m_{i,j} - m_{i,k}|$$

Music Lab Experiment

Sensible result:

- Stronger social signal leads to greater following and greater inequality.



Music Lab Experiment

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

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

Music Lab Experiment

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Very peculiar observation:

Music Lab Experiment

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Peculiar result:

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Very peculiar observation:

- The most unequal distributions would suggest the greatest variation in underlying 'quality.'

Music Lab Experiment

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Very peculiar observation:

- The most unequal distributions would suggest the greatest variation in underlying 'quality.'
- But success may be due to social construction through following.

Music Lab Experiment

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Very peculiar observation:

- The most unequal distributions would suggest the greatest variation in underlying 'quality.'
- But success may be due to social construction through following. (so let's tell a story... [8, 9])

Music Lab Experiment—Sneakiness [7]



- Inversion of download count



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

- Inversion of download count
- The pretend rich get richer …

Music Lab Experiment—Sneakiness [7]



- Inversion of download count
- The pretend rich get richer …
- … but at a slower rate

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

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