

# System Robustness

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Principles of Complex Systems, Vols. 1, 2, & 3D  
CSYS/MATH 6701, 6713, & a pretend number,  
2023–2024 | @pocsvox

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Robustness

HOT theory

Narrative causality


Random forests

Self-Organized Criticality

COLD theory

Network robustness

References



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


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
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# Outline

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## Robustness


HOT theory  
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## Robustness


HOT theory  
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## References


## References







 Many complex systems are prone to cascading catastrophic failure: **exciting!!!**

-  Blackouts
-  Disease outbreaks
-  Wildfires
-  Earthquakes
-  Organisms, individuals and societies
-  Ecosystems
-  Cities
-  Myths: Achilles.


 But complex systems also show persistent **robustness** (not as exciting but important...)

 Robustness and Failure may be a power-law story...



# Our emblem of Robust-Yet-Fragile:


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“Trouble ...”

Robustness

HOT theory

Narrative causality


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System robustness may result from

1. Evolutionary processes
2. Engineering/Design



Idea: Explore systems optimized to perform under uncertain conditions.




The handle:

'Highly Optimized Tolerance' (HOT) [4, 5, 6, 10]



The catchphrase: Robust yet Fragile



The people: Jean Carlson and John Doyle 




Great abstracts of the world #73: "There aren't any." [7]



## Features of HOT systems: [5, 6]

- High performance and robustness
- Designed/evolved to handle known stochastic environmental variability
- Fragile** in the face of unpredicted environmental signals
- Highly specialized, low entropy configurations
- Power-law distributions appear (of course...)



HOT combines things we've seen:

- Variable transformation
  - Constrained optimization
- 
- Need power law transformation between variables:  $(Y = X^{-\alpha})$
  - Recall PLIPLO is bad...
  - MIWO is good: Mild In, Wild Out
  - $X$  has a characteristic size but  $Y$  does not



## Forest fire example: [5]

- 🧱 Square  $N \times N$  grid
- 🧱 Sites contain a tree with probability  $\rho =$  density
- 🧱 Sites are empty with probability  $1 - \rho$
- 🧱 Fires start at location  $(i, j)$  according to some distribution  $P_{ij}$
- 🧱 Fires spread from tree to tree (nearest neighbor only)
- 🧱 Connected clusters of trees burn completely
- 🧱 Empty sites block fire
- 🧱 **Best case scenario:**  
Build firebreaks to maximize average # trees left intact given one spark

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## Forest fire example: <sup>[5]</sup>

- Build a forest by adding one tree at a time
- Test  $D$  ways of adding one tree
- $D =$  design parameter
- Average over  $P_{i,j}$  = spark probability
- $D = 1$ : random addition
- $D = N^2$ : test all possibilities

## Measure average area of forest left untouched


- $f(c)$  = distribution of fire sizes  $c$  (= cost)
- Yield =  $Y = \rho - \langle c \rangle$

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## Specifics:



$$P_{ij} = P_{i;a_x,b_x} P_{j;a_y,b_y}$$

where

$$P_{i;a,b} \propto e^{-[(i+a)/b]^2}$$




In the original work,  $b_y > b_x$



Distribution has more width in  $y$  direction.



## HOT Forests



$$N = 64$$

$$(a) D = 1$$

$$(b) D = 2$$

$$(c) D = N$$

$$(d) D = N^2$$

$P_{ij}$  has a  
Gaussian decay

[5]


- 🧱 Optimized forests do well on average (**robustness**)
- 🧱 But rare extreme events occur (**fragility**)

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



FIG. 2. Yield vs density  $Y(\rho)$ : (a) for design parameters  $D = 1$  (dotted curve),  $2$  (dot-dashed),  $N$  (long dashed), and  $N^2$  (solid) with  $N = 64$ , and (b) for  $D = 2$  and  $N = 2, 2^2, \dots, 2^7$  running from the bottom to top curve. The results have been averaged over 100 runs. The inset to (a) illustrates corresponding loss functions  $L = \log[\langle f \rangle / (1 - \langle f \rangle)]$ , on a scale which more clearly differentiates between the curves.

[5]






# HOT Forests:

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  $Y$  = 'the average density of trees left unburned in a configuration after a single spark hits.' [5]





FIG. 3. Cumulative distributions of events  $F(c)$ : (a) at peak yield for  $D = 1, 2, N$ , and  $N^2$  with  $N = 64$ , and (b) for  $D = N^2$ , and  $N = 64$  at equal density increments of 0.1, ranging at  $\rho = 0.1$  (bottom curve) to  $\rho = 0.9$  (top curve).



## Narrative causality:

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# Random Forests

$D = 1$ : Random forests = Percolation <sup>[11]</sup>

- ☎ Randomly add trees.
- ☎ Below critical density  $\rho_c$ , no fires take off.
- ☎ Above critical density  $\rho_c$ , percolating cluster of trees burns.
- ☎ Only at  $\rho_c$ , the critical density, is there a power-law distribution of tree cluster sizes.
- ☎ Forest is random and featureless.



# HOT forests nutshell:

- Highly structured.
- Claim power law distribution of tree cluster sizes for a broad range of  $\rho$ , including below  $\rho_c$  (but model's dynamic growth path is odd).
- No specialness of  $\rho_c$ .
- Forest states are **tolerant**.
- Uncertainty is okay if well characterized.
- If  $P_{ij}$  is characterized poorly or changes too fast, failure becomes **highly likely**.
- Growth is key to toy model which is both algorithmic and physical.
- HOT theory is more general than just this toy model.



# HOT forests—Real data:

## “Complexity and Robustness,” Carlson & Dolye [6]




Fig. 1. Log-log (base 10) comparison of DC, WWW, CF, and FF data (symbols) with PLR models (solid lines) (for  $\beta = 0, 0.9, 0.9, 1.85$ , or  $\alpha = 1/\beta = \infty, 1.1, 1.1, 0.054$ , respectively) and the SOC FF model ( $\alpha = 0.15$ , dashed). Reference lines of  $\alpha = 0.5, 1$  (dashed) are included. The cumulative distributions of frequencies  $\mathcal{P}(l \geq l_i)$  vs.  $l_i$  describe the areas burned in the largest 4,284 fires from 1986 to 1995 on all of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Lands (FF) (17), the  $>10,000$  largest California brushfires from 1878 to 1999 (CF) (18), 130,000 web file transfers at Boston University during 1994 and 1995 (WWW) (19), and code words from DC. The size units [1,000 km<sup>2</sup> (FF and CF), megabytes (WWW), and bytes (DC)] and the logarithmic decimation of the data are chosen for visualization.



These are CCDFs  
(Eek:  $P, \mathcal{P}(l \geq l_i)$ )



PLR = probability-loss-resource.



Minimize cost subject to resource (barrier) constraints:

$$C = \sum_i p_i l_i$$

given

$$l_i = f(r_i) \text{ and } \sum r_i \leq R.$$



DC = Data Compression.



Horror: log. Screaming:  
“The base! What is the base!? You monsters!”

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# HOT theory:

## The abstract story, using figurative forest fires:

 Given some measure of failure size  $y_i$  and correlated resource size  $x_i$  with relationship


$$y_i = x_i^{-\alpha}, i = 1, \dots, N_{\text{sites}}.$$

 Design system to minimize  $\langle y \rangle$  subject to a constraint on the  $x_i$ .

 Minimize cost:

$$C = \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{sites}}} \mathbf{Pr}(y_i) y_i$$

Subject to  $\sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{sites}}} x_i = \text{constant}.$



## 1. Cost: Expected size of fire:


$$C_{\text{fire}} \propto \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{sites}}} p_i a_i.$$


$a_i$  = area of  $i$ th site's region, and  $p_i$  = avg. prob. of fire at  $i$ th site over some time frame.

## 2. Constraint: building and maintaining firewalls.

Per unit area, and over same time frame:


$$C_{\text{firewalls}} \propto \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{sites}}} a_i^{1/2} a_i^{-1}.$$

 We are assuming **isometry**.

 In  $d$  dimensions,  $1/2$  is replaced by  $(d - 1)/d$

## 3. Insert assignment question to find:

$$\Pr(a_i) \propto a_i^{-\gamma}.$$



## Continuum version:

### 1. Cost function:


$$\langle C \rangle = \int C(\vec{x})p(\vec{x})d\vec{x}$$

where  $C$  is some cost to be evaluated at each point in space  $\vec{x}$  (e.g.,  $V(\vec{x})^\alpha$ ), and  $p(\vec{x})$  is the probability an Ewok jabs position  $\vec{x}$  with a sharpened stick (or equivalent).


### 2. Constraint:


$$\int R(\vec{x})d\vec{x} = c$$

where  $c$  is a constant.

 Claim/observation is that typically <sup>[4]</sup>

$$V(\vec{x}) \sim R^{-\beta}(\vec{x})$$

 For spatial systems with barriers:  $\beta = d$ .





# The HOT model in the wild



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
**Random forests**

Self-Organized Criticality

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# SOC theory

## SOC = Self-Organized Criticality

- 🧱 Idea: natural dissipative systems exist at 'critical states';
- 🧱 Analogy: Ising model with temperature somehow self-tuning;
- 🧱 Power-law distributions of sizes and frequencies arise 'for free';
- 🧱 Introduced in 1987 by Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld [3, 2, 8]:  
"Self-organized criticality - an explanation of  $1/f$  noise" (PRL, 1987);
- 🧱 **Problem:** Critical state is a very specific point;
- 🧱 Self-tuning not always possible;
- 🧱 Much criticism and arguing...

Robustness

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
Random forests


Self-Organized Criticality

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
References





“How Nature Works: the Science of Self-Organized Criticality” [a](#) [↗](#)  
by Per Bak (1997). [2]

## Avalanches of Sand and Rice ...












## "Complexity and robustness"

Carlson and Doyle,  
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., **99**, 2538–2545,  
2002. <sup>[6]</sup>

## HOT versus SOC

-  Both produce power laws
-  Optimization versus self-tuning
-  HOT systems viable over a wide range of high densities
-  SOC systems have one special density
-  HOT systems produce specialized structures
-  SOC systems produce generic structures



# HOT theory—Summary of designed tolerance <sup>[6]</sup>


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
**Table 1. Characteristics of SOC, HOT, and data**

	Property	SOC	HOT and Data
1	Internal configuration	Generic, homogeneous, self-similar	Structured, heterogeneous, self-dissimilar
2	Robustness	Generic	Robust, yet fragile
3	Density and yield	Low	High
4	Max event size	Infinitesimal	Large
5	Large event shape	Fractal	Compact
6	Mechanism for power laws	Critical internal fluctuations	Robust performance
7	Exponent $\alpha$	Small	Large
8	$\alpha$ vs. dimension $d$	$\alpha \approx (d - 1)/10$	$\alpha \approx 1/d$
9	DDOFs	Small (1)	Large ( $\infty$ )
10	Increase model resolution	No change	New structures, new sensitivities
11	Response to forcing	Homogeneous	Variable



## Avoidance of large-scale failures

- Constrained Optimization with Limited Deviations <sup>[9]</sup>
- Weight cost of larges losses more strongly
- Increases average cluster size of burned trees...
- ... but reduces chances of catastrophe
- Power law distribution of fire sizes is truncated



## Observed:


- Power law distributions often have an exponential cutoff

$$P(x) \sim x^{-\gamma} e^{-x/x_c}$$

where  $x_c$  is the approximate cutoff scale.





- May be Weibull distributions:


$$P(x) \sim x^{-\gamma} e^{-ax^{-\gamma+1}}$$









We'll return to this later on:

-  Network robustness.
-  Albert et al., Nature, 2000:  
"Error and attack tolerance of complex networks" <sup>[1]</sup>
-  General contagion processes acting on complex networks. <sup>[13, 12]</sup>
-  Similar robust-yet-fragile stories ...




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
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